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HANDGUN CONTROL: CONSTITUTIONAL
AND CRITICALLY NEEDED
MAYNARD HOLBROOK JACKSOn,, JR.*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States should move immediately to ban the import, manufacture, sale and possession of all handguns except in certain specified cases.
That flat statement is enough to set off long hours of emotional debate
between gun control advocates and gun control opponents.) But when the
obfuscating shrouds of emotionalism are removed, the light cast by the
courts' interpretation of constitutional law on the issue reveals that the legal
arguments for gun control clearly are upheld.
Central to the issue, of course, is interpretation of the second amendment
to the United States Constitution. 2 That amendment reads as follows:
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. 3
The amendment is the beginning and end of any discussion of the legal
merits of gun control. 4 Both sides claim it as evidence in their case. Analysis
* Mayor of the City of Atlanta, Georgia, and Charter Chairman of the National Gun
Control Center (Now the National Coalition to Ban Handguns). The author would like to
express his sincere appreciation to Mr. Paul Brewster, Michael H. Terry, Esq., and Mr. John
Head for their assistance in preparation of this article.
1. See generally C. BAKAL, THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS (1966) [hereinafter cited as BAKAL];
Krug, Firearms Registration:Costs v. Benefits, A Survey of State Law Enforcement Agencies
on Firearms Registration, National Shooting Sports Foundation (1970); Krug, Model Firearms
Legislation: A Compilation of Model Firearm Bill for Use by Leglislators, Government Agencies, Sportsmen and Conservationists, National Shooting Sports Foundation (1970); Yeager,
Alviani and Loving, How Well Does the Handgun Protect You and Your Family? U.S.
Conference of Mayors (1976); A Legislator's Guide to the Assessment of Criminal Justice
Legislation, Council of State Governments (1975); Gun Control, American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research (1976); Ford, Gun Control and the Second Amendment: A Bibliography, Los Angeles County Law Library (1976); Hays, The Right to Bear Arms, A Study in
Judicial Misinterpretation, 2 WM. & MARY L. REV. 381 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Hays];
Horowitz, Reflection on Gun Control: Does the Problem Have Solutions or Do the Solutions
Have Problems? 52 LAB J.208 (1976); Kates, Why a Civil LibertarianOpposes Gun Control, 3
Civ. LIB. L. REV. 24 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Kates]; Shields and Aspen, Two Judges Look at
Gun Control, 57 CHI. B. REC. 180 (1976); Comment, Shooting to Kill the Handgun: Time to
Martyr Another American "Hero", 51 J. URB. L. 491 (1974); [hereinaftercited as Shooting,
to Kill the Handgun]; Weiss, A Reply to Advocates of Gun Control Law, 52 J. URB. L. 577
(1974); Zimring, Firearmsand FederalLaw: The Gun Control Act of 1968, 4 J. LEGAL STUD.
133 (1975); Comment, Act 696: Robbing the Hunter,Hunting the Robber? 29 ARK. L. REV. 570
(1976); Nore, Criminal Law-FirearmsPossession, 3 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 375 (1975).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
3. Id.
4. See generally, Caplan, Restoring the Balance: The Second Amendment Revisted, 5
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 31 (1976); [hereinafter cited as Caplan] Feller & Gotting, 61 Nw. U. L.
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of that evidence, by either side, starts with the semantics of this seemingly
straightforward provision and harkens back to the legislative intent of the
drafters of the amendment when they proposed it in 1789. 5
REV. 46 (1966); [hereinafter cited as Feller & Gotting] Levine & Saxe, The Right to Bear Arms:
The Development of the American Experience, 7 HOUSTON L. REV. 1 (1969); [hereinafter cited
as Levine & Saxe] Rohner, The Right to Bear Arms: A Phenomenon of ConstitutionalHistory,
16 CATH. U. AM. L. REV. 53 (1966) [hereinafter as Rohner] Sprecher, The Lost Amendment, 51 ABA L. J. 554 (1965); [hereinafter cited as Sprecher] Whisker, HistoricalDevelopment
and Subsequent Erosion of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, W. VA. L. REV. 171 (1976);
Comment, ConstitutionalLimitations in Federal Firearms Regulation, 1969 DUKE L.J. 773,
787-800 [hereinafter cited as ConstitutionalLimitations in Federal FirearmsRegulation];Comment: ConstitutionalLimitation on Federal FirearmsControl, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 238 (1969).
5. Unfortunately, the motivations behind the proposal and the Senate's passage of the
second amendment are, for the large part, unrecorded, since the Senate met behind closed
doors until the sessions were made public in 1794. B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1145 (1972) [hereinafter cited as B. SCHWARTZ]. Nevertheless, a legislative history of the second amendment can be, and has been, structured.
By 1776, fear of England's standing army was a major grievance of the Colonists, and distrust
of the independence of the military characterized the Colonists's other grievances. Caplan,
supra note 4, at 35-36. Articles in a number of state Bill of Rights passed in 1776 reflected this
distrust, and indicated support for the development of a common militia consisting of citizens
of the various states. Virginia's Bill of Rights, one of the first to be ratified, included the
following language:
That a well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the
proper, natural and safe defence of a free State; that standing armies, in time of peace,
should be avoided, as dangerous to liberty; and that in all cases, the military should be
under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power.
The meaning and intent of the works, "safe defence" of a "free state", became particularly
relevant when compared to the words used by Pennsylvania to describe the use of arms by its
people.
That the people have a right to bear armsfor the defence of themselves and the state; and as
standing armies in the time of peace and dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up;
And that the military should be kept under strict subordination to, and governed by, the
civil power (emphasis added).
The training in arms for the "defence of a free state", and the training of arms for the "defence
of the people themselves" is one source of the controversy over whether the right to bear arms
is a collective or an individual right. Deleware, Maryland, North Carolina and Massachusetts
used words similar to Virginia in their bills, while Vermont incorporated Pennsylvania's
language.
At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, debate and compromise resulted in the awarding of
certain enumerated powers to Congress, including the organizing, arming, and disciplining of an
army, control over that part of the army serving the country as a whole, and power to call out
the army to enforce the law. U.S. CONST., Art. I, sec. 8, cl.16. To the states were given the
powers of appointing officers and training the militia (a special militia) according to a procedure
prescribed by Congress. The debates were marked in particular by fighting between the
Federalists, who were committed to a strong national government and a competent national
militia' and the Anti-Federalists, who favored a weaker Federal government, a state militia, and
protection of individual rights. The following excerpt indicates the issues concerning the
conventioneers:
"Saturday, August 18: Mr. GERRY took notice that there was no check here against
standing armies in time of peace. The existing Congress is so constructed, that it cannot of
itself maintain an army. This would not be the case under the new system. He thought an
army dangerous in time of peace, and could never consent to a power to keep an indefinite
number. ..
Mr. LANGON saw no room for Mr. Gerry's distrust of the representatives of the people . ..
Mr. MASON moved, as an additional power-
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.to make laws for the regulation and discipline of the militia of the several states, reserving to
the states the appointment of officers.
Mr. ELLSWORTH . . . . thought the motion of Mr. Mason went too far. He movedthat the militia should have the same arms and exercise, and be under no rules established
by the general government when in actual service of the United States; and when states
neglect to provide regulations for militia it should be regulated and established by the
legislature of the U.S.
The whole authority over the militia ought by no means to be taken away from the States,
whose consequences would pine away to nothing after such a sacrifice of power...
-Mr. PINCKNEY thought the power such a one as could not be abused, and that the states could
see the necessity of surrendering it. He had, however, but a scanty faith in militia. There must
also be a real military force . . .
-Mr. SHERMAN took notice that the States might want their militia for defence against
invasions and insurrections, and for enforcing obedience to their laws. They will not give up
this point. In giving up that of taxation, they retain a concurred power of raising money for their
own use ....
" 5 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES OF THE ADOPTION OF THE FED. CONST. IN THE CONVENTION HELD IN PHILADELPHIA IN

1789, 442-444 (1845) [hereinafter cited as ELLIOT] "Thursday,

August 23:
The report of the committee of eleven, made the 21st of August, being taken up, and the
following clause being under consideration, to wit:
To make laws for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia and for governing such
parts of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the
States, respectively, the appointment of the officers, and authority of training the militia
according to the discipline prescribed.
-Mr. SHERMAN moved to strike out the last member, 'and authority of training.' He thought it
unnecessary. The States will have this authority, of course, if not given up...
Mr. KING, by the way of explanation, said that by organizing, the committee meant, proportioning the officers and men-by arming, specifying the kind, size and calibre of arms-and by
disciplining, prescribing the manual exercise and evolutions, .
-Mr. KING added to his former explanation, that arming meant not only to provide for
uniformity of arms, but included the authority to regulate the modes of furnishing, either by the
militia themselves, the state government, or the national treasury; that laws for disciplining
must involve penalties, and every thing necessary for enforcing penalities...
-Mr. LANGDON said he could not understand the jealously expressed by some gentlemen. The
general and state governments were not enemies to each other, but different institutions for the
good of the people of America. As one of the people, he could say, 'The national government is
mine, the state government is mine'...
-Mr. MADISON. The primary object is to secure an effectual discipline of the militia. This will
no more be done, if left to the states separately, than the requisitions have been hitherto paid by
them. The States neglect their militia now . . . . The discipline of the militia is evidently a
rational concern, and ought to be provided for in the national constitution...
-Mr. GERRY. Let us at once destroy the state governments, have an executive for life, or
hereditary, and a proper Senate, and then there would be some consistency in giving full powers
to the general government: but as the states are not to be abolished, he wondered at the
attempts that were made to give powers inconsistent with their existence. He warned the
Convention against pushing the experimental too far. Some people will support a plan of
vigorous government at every risk; others, of a more democratic cast, will oppose it with equal
determination; and a civil war may be produced by the conflict."
State ratifying conventions met in 1788. Several states discussed the possibility of developing
amendments to the Constitution, including an amendment proclaiming the right of the people to
bear arms in defense of their state. Maryland was the first to note its fear of Congress's control
of the militia. Pennsylvania was next, asserting the right of a concurrent state power to arm and
discipline the militia if the federal government failed to do so or was arming against them.
Virginia's discussion of the issue appeared to be the most significant, since James Madison, a
native of the state, used Virginia's recommendations (as representative of what the states
desired) in proposing the second amendment in 1789. Included in these recommendations was
the concept that "each state shall have the power to provide for the organizing, arming and
disciplining its own militia, whensoever Congress shall omit or neglect to provide for the
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For those who oppose gun control, the amendment's simplicity lends
itself only to the most simplistic of interpretations. It says to them that each
individual citizen of this nation has the right to own guns and that right
legally cannot be taken away. 6 Their argument is that "the people" in the
second amendment is synonymous with "the people" in the first amendment's "right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances;" '7 of the fourth amendment's
,"right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures;" ' 8 of the ninth amendment's right of privacy to be "retained by the people;" 9 and of the tenth
amendment's powers0 not delegated nor prohibited are reserved to the states
or "to the people."'
In an effort to bolster this argument, the anti-gun control forces contend
that there is evidence that the framers of the constitutional amendment
believed the right of every citizen to bear arms to be a cornerstone of
freedom." The Senate of 1789 refused to limit the scope of the amendment
same." The recommendation was not finally included in the second amendment. It did however
illustrate the fear of the states that the federal government's power to arm a militia on its own
might lead to the destruction of the state's militia and other rights of the people. Lavine & Saxe,
supra note 4, at 4-6. Madison's proposal read as follows:
That the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed and
well regulated militia being the best security of a free country; but no person religously
scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service in person. (E.
DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 11 (1957) [hereinafter cited
as E. DUMBAULD].

His proposal was submitted to a Committee of the House. The ensuing debate characterized it
as a concurrent protection for the states from the arbritrariness and threat of a standing army.
Several weeks later, the committee passed the bill out to the Senate.
The Senate's final
version stated that -[A] well regulated militia, being the best security of a free State, the right of
the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." Id., at 45 n.6 (1957). The words,
"composed of the body of the people, coming after "militia" in the House version, were
deleted; also omitted was the language exempting men with religious scruples from martial
duty. Id. These were the Senate's only changes.
6. See Hardy & Stompoly, Of Arms andthe Law, 51 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 62, 69-72 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Hardy & Stompoly]; Levine & Saxe, supra note 4; Weiss, supra note 1, at
580-81.
7. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or of the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances."
U.S. CONST. amend. I. See also Hardy & Stompoly, supra note 6, at 68-69.
8. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, or particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9. "The ...
enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
10. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend.
X.
11. See generally, Kates, supra note 1, at 24;3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 746 (1833); FirearmsLegislation: Hearingsbefore the Subcomm.
on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 100 (1974) (testimony by
Hon. Steven D. Symms) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Hearings].
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by insertion of the phrase "for the common defence." 12 That rejection, the
gun supporters say, indicates that the second amendment was conceived as a
to bear arms, but as a
guarantee not only of a common, collective right
13
guarantee of the individual right to bear arms.
Furthermore, the handgun proponents quote James Madison as saying
that the United States would not be a tyranny such as the governments of
Europe, because the young nation would "trust the people with arms." 14
The pro-handgun argument is overly simplistic in its substance and in its
conclusion. The amendment and the history surrounding its enactment must
be taken as a whole. 5 The second amendment clearly refers to the "free
state" needing protection and specifies that a "well-regulated Militia" is to
give that protection. 16 At the time of the amendment's drafting, almost
every citizen of this young and struggling nation was considered a front-line
soldier-a member of the militia. 17 Therefore, it was natural for the writers
to "the people'"-meaning "the people" of
to assign the right to bear arms
8
a "well-qualified Militia."'
As for rejection of the term "for the common good," it should be noted
that this phrase was suggested after the substance of the amendment had
been agreed to. 19 At this point, only technical changes were being made: for
example, substituting "necessary to the" in lieu of "the best" and renaming the article "the fourth" rather than "the fifth" .2o While gun advocates
argue that the clause was rejected because it would have the effect of
restricting the right to bear arms,2 1 it is more plausible that it was rejected
for a technical reason; that reason being that the phrase would have been
of a wellredundant. The amendment already meant the right of the people
22
regulated militia to bear arms for the security of a free state.
12. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 1153-1154.
13. See Nunn v. State, I Ga. 243 (1846); State v. Kerner, 181 N.C. 574, 107 S.E. 222 (1921);
Andrews v. State, 3 Heisk (1871); Bliss v. Commonwealth, 2 Litt. (Ky.) 90, 13 Am. Dec. 251
(1822); see generally, Hays, supra note l, at 405-406; Goldwater, Why Gun-Control Laws Don't
Wash, READER'S DIG. 184 (Dec. 1975); Caplan, supra note 4, at 48-49.
14.

A. HAMILTON, J. JAY & J. MADISON,

THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 46, 335 (1961)

[hereinafter cited as Madison]; Caplan, supra note 4, at 40.
15. See Note, Firearms Legislation, 18 VAND L. REV. 1362, 1370 (1965), where the author
discusses pre-constitutional, common law history.
16. See discussion at note 5 supra on Madison's recommendations. See also the oft-quoted
statement of Congressman Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, in context in 1 ANNALS OF CONG.
778 (1789). B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5,at 1107-8.
17.

R. POUND, DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF LIBERTY 90 (1957).

18. Shooting to Kill the Handgun, supra note 1, at 516-17.
19. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 5, at 1154. On Friday, September 4, 1789, after the House
had sent its list of approved amendments to the Senate, the Senators adopted the House's
amendment concerning the right to bear arms. Id.at 1146. On Monday, the 7th, motions were
made for striking certain words and substituting other words in the amendment. Id.at 1154. The
amendment was not discussed again, until its approval by both House and Senate on September
25. Id. at 1163-64.

20. Id. at 1154.
21. Caplan, supra note 4, at 42-43.
22. Supra note 2.
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Madison's statement that the United States would "trust the people with
arms" 23 argues the pro-handgun position only when taken out of the context
of Madison's argument. Madison was, in fact, arguing that the state government would protect the citizenry from a too powerful federal government. A
more extensive quotation of this argument illustrates this point in THE
FEDERALIST PAPERS:

Notwithstanding the military establishments in the several kingdoms
of Europe, which are carried as far as the public resource will bear,
the governments are afraid to trust the people with arms. And it is
not certain, that with this aid alone, they would not be able to shake
off their yokes. But were the people to possess the additional advantages of local governments chosen by themselves, who could collect

the national will, and direct the national force, and officers appointed out of the militia, by these governments, and attached to both

them and the militia it may be affirmed with greatest assurance, that
the throne of every tyranny in Europe would be speedily overturned

in spite of the legions which surround it.24
Clearly, Madison's thrust was that the citizens of the United States would
be free from tyranny by the federal government because the people could
unite through their strong, elected, local governments, which the people of
Europe did not have. Further, the citizens of the United States could unite
with the armed people of the militia, which Europeans did not have either,
and oppose the tyranny of a despotic federal government and its standing
army.
A review of constitutional case law involving the second amendment
shows the weight of court decisions falling heavily on the side of those who
favor government regulation of firearms.2 5 Federal court rulings have construed the second amendment to be something less than an absolute guaran26
tee of the right of every citizen to keep a gun.
23. Supra note 14.
24. MADISON, supra note 14.
25. See Barrett v. United States, 96 S.Ct. 498 (1976); Huddleston v. United States, 415
U.S. 814 (1974); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174
(1939).; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); United States v. Birmley, 529 F.2d 103
(6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Petruci,
486 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 416 U.S. 937 (1971); United States v. Nelson, 458 F.2d
556 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Tomlin, 454 F.2d 176 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied 406 U.S.
924 (1972); United States v. McCutcheon, 446 F.2d 133 (7th Cir 1971); Varitimo v. United
States, 404 F.2d 1030 (ist Cir. 1968), cert. denied 395 U.S. 976 (1968); Eckert v. St. of
Pennsylvania, 331 F. Supp. 1361 (E.D. Pa. 1971). aff'd 474 F.2d 1339 (1973), cert. denied 410
U.S. 989 (1971), and 411 U.S. 920 (1971); United States v. Gross, 313 F. Supp. 1330 (S.D. Ind.
1970), aff'd 451 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Adams, 11 F. Supp. 216 (S.D. Fla.
1935).
26. See generally, United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1976) cert. denied 96 S. Ct.
3168 (1976); United States v. Swinton, 521 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Romero,
484 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1973); Eckert v. City of Phildelphia, 477 F.2d 610 (3rd Cir. 1973);
United States v. Day, 476 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1973); Cody v. United States, 460 F.2d 34 (8th Cir.
1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 1010 (1972); Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1971).
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The earliest United States Supreme Court decision concerning the scope
of the second amendment is found in United States v. Cruikshank.2 7 The
Court addressed itself to the question of whether there existed a right to bear
arms for a lawful purpose. Mr. Chief Justice Waite, speaking for the
majority, wrote that this right to bear arms is neither a right granted by the
Constitution, nor is it dependent upon the Constitution for its existence-the
28
second amendment imposed limitations only upon the federal government.
"The Second Amendment declares that. . . this, as has been seen, means
no more than it shall not be infringed by Congress." 29 Hence, individual
states may enact gun control legislation without transgressing the second
amendment.
This interpretation of the scope of the second amendment was supported
in Presser v. Illinois30 where the Court once again stated that the second
amendment is not a limitation upon the states. In that case, the Court went a
step further in their rationale. Mr. Justice Woods wrote that the states could
be prevented from prohibiting the right to bear arms only if it could be
demonstrated that, in doing so, there was an attempt to "deprive the United
States of their rightful resource for maintaining the public security, and.
31
disable the people from performing their duty to the general government." 32
This is clearly neither the intent nor the result of gun control legislation.
The most important consideration, is the preservation of public peace and
the protection of the people against violence, which are also constitutional
duties. 33 When examining the right to keep and bear arms, this must be kept
in mind.
In a lower court decision, Aymette v. State, 34 Judge Green indicates the
inherent danger of a very narrow reading of the second amendment. "To
hold that the legislature could pass no law upon this subject to preserve
public peace, and to protect our citizens from the terror which a wanton and
unusual exhibition of arms might produce . . . would be to pervert a great
political right to the worst of purposes and to make it a social evil of
27. 92 U.S. 542(1876).
28. Id. at 553.
29. Id. "This is one of the amendments that has no other effect than to restrict the powers
of the national government, leaving the people to look for their protection against any violation
by their fellow-citizens of the rights it recognizes to what is called . . . the 'powers which relate
to merely municipal legislation, or what was, perhaps, more properly called internal police,' not
surrendered or restrained by the Constitution of the United States." Id.
30. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
31. Id. at 265. "It is undoubtedly true that all citizens capable of bearing arms constitute
the reserved force or reserved militia of the United States as well as of the States, and, in view
of this prerogative of the general government, as well as of its general powers, the States
cannot, even laying the constitutional provision in question out of view, prohibit the people
from keeping and bearing arms." Id.
562, 116 N.E. 182 (1917).
32. Biffer v. City of Chicago, 278 I11.
33. State v. Dawson, 272 N.C. 535, 159 SE2d 1 (1967).
34. 2 Humph. 154 (1840).
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infinitely a greater extent to society [than] would result from abandoning the
right itself.""

The United States Supreme Court has also interpreted the second amendment in terms of the need for a well established militia. Article 1, section 8,
clause 16, of the United States Constitution gives Congress the power
to
36
provide for the organizing, arming and disciplining of the militia.
In United States v. Miller,37 the court determined that section 11 of the
National Firearms Act, which required registration to possess, to ship, or to
deliver any firearm, did not violate the second amendment. By recognizing
the constitutionality of this Act, the Court reiterated that the second amendment is not absolute. This decision by the Court is consistent with past
interpretations of the second amendment. 38 In Miller, Mr. Justice McReynolds stated that the second amendment must be interpreted in relation to
this power. 39 The purpose of the second amendment is to maintain the
effectiveness of the militia as a whole. The second amendment as interpreted within this context refers to a collective right and not an individual
right.4 °
United States v. Miller also makes reference to the types of weapons to
which the second amendment addresses itself. In that case, the Court ruled
that a sawed-off shotgun did not contribute to the preservation of a wellregulated militia. 4 1 "Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this
weapon is in any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could
contribute to the common defense." 4 2 Since the purpose of this amendment,
as noted previously, is to render effective the military, the logical conclusion is to prohibit those weapons which do not contribute towards this
goal.43 English v. State44 is much more specific on this point. This lower
court decision stated that "the word 'arms' in the connection we find it in
the constitution of the United States, refers to the arms of a militiaman or
35. Id. at 123-124.
36. "To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such
Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States
respectively, the Appointment of officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to
the discipline prescribed by Congress."
37. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
38. Supra note 27 and 30 and accompanying text.
39. 307 U.S. at 178.
40. Id. at 179-182.
41. Id. at 178.
42. Id.
43. See for example, Rinzler v. Carson, 262 So.2d 661, (1972); State v. Lee, 277 N.C. 242,
176 SE2d 772 (1970); Morrison v. State, 170 Tex. Crim. 218, 339 Sw2d 529 (1960); Fall v. Esso
Standard Oil Co., 297 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied 371 U.S. 814 (1962); State v. Kerner,
181 N.C. 574, 107 S.E. 222 (1921); State v. Godfrey, 17 Or. 300, 20 P.625 (1889); Hill v. State, 53
Ga. 472 (1874); English v. State, 35 Tex. 476 (1871-2); In re Brickey, 8 Idaho 597, 70 P. 609
(1902); 79 AM. JUR. 2d Weapons and Firearms-§§7-23 (1975).
44. 35 Tex. 476 (1871-2).
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soldier, and the word is used in its military sense. , 45 This indicates that the
right to bear46a handgun would not fall within the purview of the second
amendment.
The most definitive gun control case, United States v. Miller,47 was
decided in 1939. In 1972, the right to bear arms was a tangential issue in the
case of Adams v. Williams. 48 Mr. Justice Douglas gave clear indication
that the right to bear arms is not absolute:
There is under our decision no reason why stiff state laws governing
the purchase and possession of pistols may not be enacted. There is
no reason why pistols may not be barred from anyone with a police
record. There is no reason why a State may not require a purchaser
of a pistol to pass a psychiatric test. There is no reason why all
pistols should not be barred from everyone except the police.49
The reasoning for this, as indicated by Mr. Justice Douglas, is quite simple:
the purpose of the second amendment is to maintain or "keep alive" the
militia.5 ° Accordingly, it 'is not consistent with these various case interpreta51
tions that there is any individual and absolute right to bear arms.
CONCLUSION

Having reached the conclusion that the control of the sale and possession
of handguns constitutionally is within the purview of government, the next
step is the call to action. What must the government do to accomplish this
vital goal?
The elimination of the handgun menace cannot be accomplished on a
national level simply by the passage of laws on the federal level. 52 There
must be a coordinated effort involving all levels of government. Along with
the federal government, state and local governments must take part in
more important, in the enforcement aspects of
legislative initiatives and,
53
handgun control efforts.
45. Id. at 477.
46. The issue of whether a certain type of weapon is or is not related to collective security
can depend upon whether constitutions of individual states favor the absolute-right-to-arms or
the collective-security-right-to-arms interpretation of the second amendment. Rohner, supra
note 4, at 70-72. Compare Bliss v. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822) with People ex. rel.
Darling v. Warden, 154 App. Div. 413, 139 N.Y.S. 277 (1913). Recently, the problem of defining
what weapons are necessary for protection in a military, collective sense can be also traced to
the lack of proper defining of what weapons would be "suitable for military use" by the federal
courts (as well as by the Supreme Court). Constitutional Limitations on Federal Firearms
Regulation, supra note 4, at 799-800. See also Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472 (1874).
47. Supra note 37.
48. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
49. Id. at 150 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 151 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
51. Constitutional Limitations on FederalFirearms Regulations, supra note 4, at 799; see
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178; United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d at 106.
52. See C. BAKAL, supra note 1, at 166-187, 1975 Hearings, supra note 11, at 194-199
(testimony of John R. Jensen).
53. Id. at 133-136.
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There is a need for strong, new local handgun control laws on the books
in every state. 54 It is my opinion that existing handgun controls in the few
states that have such laws fail to do what is needed because of their limited
scope.5 5 State legislation should ban the import, manufacture, sale or possession of handguns and handgun ammunition, except in specified cases
under certain controlled conditions. 56 The exceptions would be: use of
handguns by the military, the police, "sporting clubs" and "collectors." In
the case of sporting clubs, strict legislation and security procedures, which
ensure that weapons will be used only under controlled conditions at the
club, must be spelled out in the law. In the case of collectors, it must be
required that all handguns be certified to be incapable of being fired and that
they are for collection and display purposes only.
It is essential to note in this context that simply turning-off the water does
keep the bucket from continuing to overflow. Once the massive annual
increase in handguns has been stopped, it will be possible to work more
effectively with reducing the handgun menace in our nation.5 7 While
governmental confiscation from private individuals is not realistic, we
should confiscate and destroy all illegal guns obtained by law enforcement
officials, in the legal performance of their duties. 58 This loss of property is a
necessary additional penalty for law breakers and eventually will act to
forty million handguns in this country and the ease of
reduce the estimated
59
access to them.
54. Firearms and Violence in American Life, A Staff Report, National Comm. on the
Causes and Prevention of Violence 94-5 (1969).
55. C. BAKAL, supra note 1, at 149-165. See for example, ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-911 et. seq.
(1976-77); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-3101-§ 41-3175 (1976); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-26-101-§ 1226-104, § 12-27-101-§ 12-27-104, § 18-12-108 (1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-206 (West
1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.011-§ 790.26 (1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9910a-§ 26-9916a, § 92A901- § 92A-911 (1972); IDAHO CODE § 18-3301-§ 18-3315 (1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 48-1901-§ 481905 (Supp. 1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 527.010-§ 527.060 (1975); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 25 § 2031 et.
seq. (1964) tit. 17a § 1051-1055 (1976); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-8-201 et. seq. (1975); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-1001-§ 28-1011.34 (1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.250 et. seq. (1967); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 40a et. seq. (1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-402 et. seq. (1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 1272.1-§ 1289.17 (West 1976-77); VA. CODE § 18.2-279-§ 18.2-311.1 (1976); Wis. STAT.
ANN. (generally) (West 1976-77).
56. South Carolina did possess a statute (S.C. CODE § 16-144 (1962))which had made it
unlawful for any "person to manufacture, sell, offer for sale, lease, rent, barter, exchange or
transport for sale. into this State, any pistol of less length and weight (than twenty inches and
three pounds in weight)." That law has been repealed and replaced by S.C. CODE § 16-129-§ 16129.7 (1975). Massachusetts voters recently defeated a referendum which would have banned
the private ownership of handguns. Charlton, New England Returns Incumbents In Contestfor
Senate and House, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1976, at 23, col. 3.
57. 1975 Hearings, supra note 11, at 2640-2643.
58. For an example of what has been accomplished in this area, see 1975 Hearings, supra
note 11, at 500 (testimony of Francis Kane).
59. Id. at 7 (statement of Hon. Abner J. Mikva); Id. at 265, 266 (testimony of Rex D.
Davis).
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